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The Banking Shuffle: Barring the Reordering of
Consumer Transactions and Other Recommendations
I. INTRODUCTION
Banks have been doing the shuffle. Not on the dance floor, but
with consumer transactions. By shuffling transactions and processing
them largest to smallest, rather than chronologically, banks increase the
number of overdraft fees consumers pay.1 Imagine a consumer had $100
in her checking account and made several purchases throughout the day.
The consumer started the day off with a $5 cup of coffee, paid $50 for a
phone bill, $40 for gas, and, with only $5 remaining in her account, $100
for groceries. For the last transaction, the consumer accepted the $34
overdraft fee2 for the single transaction that created a negative balance.
However, if instead of processing the transactions in chronological order,
the bank were to debit her account for the $100 transaction first, the
consumer must accept three overdraft fees—paying the bank $105 in
overdraft fees instead of $35. This is the banking shuffle and banks
should be barred from this practice.3
Consumer lawsuits against banks for wrongful overdraft charges
from overdraft protection programs have prompted the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to consider new regulations aimed
at overdraft fees.4 Although consumers can benefit from their bank or
credit union covering an important payment that may have otherwise

1. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Big Banks Have Been Gaming Your Overdraft Fees to
Charge You More Money, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 17, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/17/wells-fargo-to-make-changesto-protect-customers-from-overdraft-fees/.
2. CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU:
NEWSROOM
(July
31,
2014),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-finds-small-debit-purchases-lead-toexpensive-overdraft-charges/ (finding $34 median overdraft free).
3. See id. (noting nonprofits are “pressing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
to write rules to require all banks to end high-to-low reordering”).
4. See Impacts of Overdraft Programs on Consumers, 77 Fed. Reg. 12031, 12031 (Feb.
28, 2012) (addressing concerns about overdraft protection programs); Douglas-Gabriel, supra
note 1 (noting consumer lawsuits exposed wrongful overdraft charge practices and the
CFPB’s attention to the issue).
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bounced, overdraft programs still have “the capacity to inflict serious
economic harm on [consumers].”5 The economic harm can result from
banks shuffling transactions, leading to more overdraft fees, or from
banks charging high fees for accessing the overdraft service.6
The CFPB’s purpose is “to implement and, where applicable,
enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial
products and services and that markets for consumer financial products
and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”7 After analyzing the
statutory standards of fairness, transparency, and competition, this Note
concludes that the CFPB should prohibit banks from reordering consumer
transactions.8 In meeting its purpose, the CFPB should promote
consumer economic freedom by forcing banks to chronologically order
consumer transactions and creating more transparency of overdraft
programs.9 Assuming that a consumer knows and understands the risk of
overdraft protection programs,10 overly restrictive policies on overdraft
fees would negatively affect consumer choice and the banking industry’s
bottom lines particularly in small financial institutions. 11
5. Gary Stein, Comment Period on Overdrafts Extended to June 29, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU: BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/commentperiod-on-overdrafts-extended-to-june-29/.
6. See id. (noting the CFPB is monitoring risks posed by overdraft protection programs
to make informed decisions for regulation).
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012); see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, About Us, (Aug. 19,
2015) [hereinafter CFPB About Us], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/
(describing CFPB’s functions).
8. See Jeff Bater, CFPB Flexes Enforcement Power To Attack Bad Practices, 105
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 386 (Sept. 18, 2015) (“[C]oming rules could require better
disclosures and bar banks from reordering transactions in a way that triggers overdrafts.”).
9. See, e.g., Eric Grover, A New Congress, A New Chance To Rein In the CFPB, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 13, 2015 (determining that the CFPB is administrative law on steroids because
the agency is creating laws, a power given to Congress).
10. While the CFPB study did not contain consumers directly identifying personal
information, the CFPB plans further studies on how overdraft works and how it is affecting
consumers. CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra
note 2. Additionally, a 2014 Pew Charitable Trust study found more than half of the people
who overdrew their checking accounts at an ATM in the past year didn’t remember consenting
to the overdraft service. Heather Long, Overdraft Fees Top $1 Billion at the Big 3 Banks,
CNN
MONEY
(May
27,
2015
12:11
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/27/investing/overdraft-fees-over-1-billion-big-banks/. Pew
Charitable Trust is a foundation that conducts research. PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, MISSION &
VALUES, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/mission-and-values.
11. Smaller banks have become heavily reliant on overdraft fees to make money, such
as Woodforest National Bank in Texas. Long, supra note 10; Falling Overdraft Takes a Bite
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This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II presents background
information on overdraft protection programs and the corresponding
regulation.12 Part III discusses the pre-CFPB data and current data on
overdraft protection programs.13 It also contends that the CFPB needs
more data to avoid issuing a premature rulemaking. 14 With fairness,
transparency, and competition in mind, Part IV examines the overdraft
protection program issues likely to be tackled in any rulemaking. 15 Part
V identifies the practical implications of proposed regulations and
concludes that transaction reordering should be barred.16
II. OVERDRAFT PROTECTION PROGRAMS AND THEIR REGULATION
Banks offer overdraft programs as a service that imposes a fee on
a consumer’s account when the consumer spends or withdraws more
money than is available.17 Before automated overdraft systems, banks
would manually review a customer’s account and, as a courtesy, pay
insufficient funds based on the institution’s relationship with the
customer.18 This process saved the customer from the embarrassment of
having to pay a bounced check fee to the check payee by instead paying
an overcharge directly to the bank.19 The inefficient system of manual
review was replaced by automated overdraft systems.20 Banks continued
the courtesy payment for bounced checks known as non-sufficient funds
(“NSF”) until Regulation E was amended in 2010 requiring banks to
Out Of Banks’ Bottom Line, CONSUMER BANKERS ASS’N (June 17, 2015),
http://consumerbankers.com/cba-media-center/cba-news/falling-overdraft-takes-bite-outbanks%E2%80%99-bottom-line (“Overdraft fee revenue accounts for a greater share of
revenue at banks with less than $1 billion in assets.”); see also Annamaria Andriotis & Peter
Rudegeair, Banks Feel Pinch From Declining Overdraft Fees, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2015
6:29 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-feel-pinch-from-declining-overdraft-fees1434493786 (noting that banks have been forced to find additional revenue or make cuts, such
as personnel reductions or bank closures, to make up for the losses of overdraft revenue).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Dan Rutherford, Consumer Advisory: You’ve Got Options When It Comes to
Overdraft,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU:
BLOG
(Apr.
28,
2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/category/overdrafts/.
18. Impacts of Overdraft Programs on Consumers, 77 Fed. Reg. 12031, 12031 (Feb. 28,
2012).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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receive customer permission before charging a fee.21 Thus, the customer
had the choice to opt-in to an overdraft protection program.22 In response
to the customer opting out, the bank could decline to complete the
transaction if the customer did not opt-in or, alternatively, the bank could
pay the transaction as a free of charge courtesy. 23 Currently, if a customer
opts-in, banks generally charge an overdraft fee when a check is returned,
when the overdraft service is used, and when an overdraft is not repaid
on time.24
The Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”)25 undertook initial
regulation of overdraft protection programs before the CFPB was
created.26 No agency had exclusive control over consumer financial
protection regulation since it was divided among several government
agencies.27 The FRB remained in charge of enforcing Regulation E until
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) transferred the responsibility of consumer issues to
the CFPB.28 The CFPB was given the power to “regulate the offering
and provision of consumer financial products or services under the
federal consumer financial laws.”29
The CFPB’s goals include: (1) “prevent[ing] financial harm to
consumers while promoting good practices that benefit them”; (2)
“empower[ing] consumers to live better financial lives”; and (3)
“inform[ing] the public, policy makers, and the CFPB’s own policy21. Id. at 12032; Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12
C.F.R. § 1005.17(b) (2012).
22. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17(b) (requiring opt-in).
23. See id. (requiring that banks customers opt in to overdraft protection programs, not
that banks provide overdraft protection).
24. Impacts of Overdraft Programs on Consumers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 12033.
25. The Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) refers to the Board of the Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1061(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (2012) (creating the CFPB in 2010); TODD BEAUCHAMP &
LAWRENCE KAPLAN, PAUL HASTINGS, THE FED. RESERVE BD.’S FINAL RULE ON OVERDRAFT
PROGRAMS:
THE
FINAL
WORD?
(Dec.
2009),
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1474.pdf. The FRB worked with other
agencies to issue guidance for overdraft programs. Id.
27. Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 327 (2013).
28. Dodd-Frank § 1061 (b)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1). Dodd-Frank also transferred the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency’s (“OCC”) authority over consumer issues to the CFPB. Dodd-Frank § 1061(b)(2),
(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(2), (4).
29. Dodd-Frank § 1011(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).
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making with data-driven analysis of consumer finance markets and
consumer behavior.”30 These goals serve as an internal initiative to meet
the purpose, objectives, and functions set forth in Dodd-Frank.31
The CFPB uses its inherited Regulation E in enforcement actions,
specifically the opt-in requirement.32 CFPB’s enforcement on overdraft
programs has preceded any formal rulemaking.33 On December 27, 2011,
the CFPB published for comment an interim final rule that revised
Regulation E.34 The interim final rule prohibited financial institutions
from charging fees for transactions that overdraw an account by use of a
debit card at an ATM and point-of-sale, unless the consumer opts-in to
an overdraft protection program.35 Essentially, consumers have to opt-in
to the overdraft program when the account is opened, and if they choose
not to opt-in, the bank will deny the transaction in order to avoid an
overdraft.36 Regulation E also outlines the requirements for overdraft
protection programs regarding consumer transparency, disclosures on
banking practices, and abuse of the program.37
In 2012, the CFPB put out its Notice and Request for Information
regarding the impacts of overdraft protection programs on consumers.38
Overdraft protection programs first appeared on the CFPB regulatory
agenda in fall 2013 and were anticipated to be under consideration from
November 1, 2013 to October 31, 2014.39 Overdraft program research

30. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2013 - FY 2017, 8 (2013).
While the CFPB has four goals, this Note focuses on the three goals that are geared toward
consumers, unlike the fourth goal, which focuses on the CFPB’s internal performance. Id.
31. See Dodd-Frank § 1021(a)–(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)–(c) (describing the purpose,
objectives, and functions of the CFPB).
32. Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. §
1005.17(b)(1) (2012); see, e.g., Bob Sullivan, CFPB: Bank Charged $50M in Illegal
Overdraft
Fees,
CREDIT.COM:
PERS.
FIN.
(Apr.
28,
2015),
http://time.com/money/3839951/cfpb-regions-bank-charged-50m-illegal-overdraft-fees/
(noting the enforcement against Regions bank).
33. Bater, supra note 8.
34. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17 (2012).
35. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b). On November 17, 2009, prior to the CFPB’s amendment, the
FRB had published final regulations amending Regulation E to require banks to attain
consumer permission before enrolling them in overdraft protection programs. Id.
36. Adam Levin, Banks Still Raking In the Profits from Overdraft Fees, CREDIT.COM
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://blog.credit.com/2012/10/banks-still-raking-in-the-profits-on-overdraftfees-62858/.
37. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17.
38. Impacts of Overdraft Programs on Consumers, 77 Fed. Reg. 39, 12031, 12031 (Feb.
28, 2012).
39. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 79 Fed. Reg. 4, 1242, 1242 (Jan. 7, 2014).
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continued to stay on the CFPB’s semiannual regulatory agenda until the
Spring 2015 rulemaking agenda.40 In the Spring 2015 rulemaking
agenda, the overdraft issue was in the pre-rule stage and focused on
research to assess whether rulemaking was warranted.41 The overdraft
issue has remained in the pre-rule stage since fall 2013, and the CFPB
has continued to push back the final rule stage.42 In fact, the CFPB
missed the proposed end date for pre-rule activities originally scheduled
for October 2015.43 This could be due to the need for more data.44
III. LACK OF DATA
Consumer behavior will influence whether a new rule on
overdraft protection programs is needed.45 In meeting its goal to inform,
the CFPB must first collect data on consumer behavior.46 Issues requiring
research include recidivism,47 the impact of Regulation E’s opt-in
requirement,48 and consumer need for the overdraft protection program.49
Furthermore, the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) has identified
inaccuracies in the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database
(“Database”).50

40. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 117, 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
41. 80 Fed. Reg. 117, at 35117.
42. 79 Fed. Reg. 4 at 1242 (ending pre-rule activities October 2014); OFFICE OF INFO. &

REG. AFF., 3170-AA42, SEMIANNUAL REG. AGENDA (Spring 2014) (ending pre-rule activities
Feb. 2015); Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 79 Fed. Reg. 245, 76808, 76809 (Dec. 22, 2014)
(noting continued research on overdraft programs); 80 Fed. Reg. 117 at 35117 (ending prerule activities October 2015).
43. Michael Ferullo, Rules on Payday Loans, Debt Collection, Mortgage Data Expected
in Busy 2015 for CFPB, 104 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 167 (Jan. 27, 2015); 80 Fed. Reg.
117 at 35117.
44. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 117, 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
45. 77 Fed. Reg. 39, 12031, 12032–33 (Feb. 28, 2012) (seeking information on overdraft
programs and “costs, benefits, and risks to consumers”).
46. See id.
47. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: CHECKING ACCOUNT
OVERDRAFT, 13 (July 2014) [hereinafter DATA POINT] (noting the causal relationship between
opting-in, frequent overdrafts and the need for further study).
48. See infra Part IV.
49. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB STUDY OF OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, 58
(2013)
[hereinafter
WHITE
PAPER],
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf
(identifying transaction reordering by banks and other issues).
50. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., Audit Report, 2015-FMIC-C-016, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST
TO ENHANCE MANAGEMENT CONTROLS OVER THE CFPB’S CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATABASE
(Sept. 10, 2015). This is the current approach to data analysis. Id.; The CPFB’s complaint
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Pre-CFPB Data

A 2008 study published by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC Study”) determined that of the 1,171 FDICsupervised banks surveyed, 86% operated at least one formal overdraft
program and 40.5% of all banks offered automated overdraft protection
programs.51 Aligning with Regulation E, in 2010, the FDIC issued a final
supervisory guidance providing guiding expectations with respect to
overdraft protection programs.52
B.

Current Data

A 2013 white paper (“White Paper”) and a July 2014 report
(“2014 Report”) summarized the CFPB’s current data on overdraft
protection services.53 Although the CFPB planned to release the results
of further research in October 2015, this data remains undisclosed.54
The White Paper was comprised of data collected by the CFPB
from a sampling of larger banks under the CFPB’s supervision.55 The
data revealed that the average overdraft fee was $34 in 2012 and that most
financial institutions provided some form of overdraft protection.56 The
study also revealed that 44.7% of accounts that had more than ten
overdraft items during the first six months of 2010 elected to opt-in by
the end of that same year.57 Overdraft fees in 2015 were down 4% from
2014, the largest drop since 2011.58 The decline in this source of fee
income negatively affected banks’ bottom lines.59 Smaller banks will
database can be found here: http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase.
51. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS at III,
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2008).
52. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-81-2010, OVERDRAFT PAYMENT PROGRAMS AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION FINAL OVERDRAFT PAYMENT SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Nov. 24,
2010) [hereinafter GUIDANCE]. The guidance reaffirmed existing expectations and provided
specific guidance with respect to automated overdraft payment programs. Id.; see also FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT PROGRAM SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter FAQ] (expanding clarification
on potential issues financial institutions may face).
53. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 4-7; DATA POINT, supra note 49, at 5.
54. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 117, 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
55. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 4.
56. Id. at 52–54.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Andriotis & Rudegeair, supra note 11.
59. Id.; Falling Overdraft Takes a Bite Out Of Banks’ Bottom Line, supra note 11.
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likely feel a greater impact from regulations aimed to deter consumers
from using overdraft protection programs because the largest percent of
their yearly earnings stem from overdraft fees. 60
Data from the 2014 Report revealed that nearly one in five
consumers who opted-in to an overdraft protection program had more
than ten overdrafts per year.61 It noted that consumers who opt-in for
overdraft protection services incur the majority of their debit card
overdraft fees on transactions of $24 or less.62 For example, small
transactions, like a cup of coffee, can lead to expensive overdraft
charges.63 With this in mind, the CFPB acknowledged that consumers’
personal needs and preferences influence their banking practices and
thus, affect why accounts are overdrawn.64 Although the CFPB did not
specifically disclose what these personal reasons were, the consumer
complaint database provides personal examples of why consumers
availed themselves of the overdraft service.65 For instance, a customer
from Bank of America forgot about a written check that overdrew the
account.66 Additionally, a SunTrust customer had a bill withdrawn two
days earlier than the customer expected causing the overdraft protection
service to take care of subsequent purchases.67
In regards to transaction ordering, the CFPB found that debit

60. See Neha Dimri & Richa Naidu, Regional U.S. Banks Face Hit From Looming
Overdraft
Rules,
REUTERS
(June
9,
2015,
1:54
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/09/usa-banks-overdraftsidUSL3N0YU3QT20150609 (noting, for example, Louisiana-based South Bancorp Inc. gets
about a fifth of its earnings per share from overdraft programs, while SunTrust—a larger
bank—gets a tenth from overdraft fees).
61. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 13.
62. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 18; CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to
Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra note 2.
63. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 5.
64. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 62.
65. E.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, COMPLAINT ID 1689631, Comment to
Consumer Complaints with Consumer Complaint Narratives (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
COMPLAINT ID 1689631], https://data.consumerfinance.gov/dataset/Consumer-Complaintswith-Consumer-Complaint-Narrat/nsyy-je5y. The consumer complaint database allows
consumers to upload complaints about financial products and services, however, not all the
facts alleged in the complaints are verified. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER
COMPLAINT DATABASE, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase.
66. COMPLAINT ID 1689631, supra note 65.
67. CFPB, COMPLAINT ID 1682528, Comment to Consumer Complaints with Consumer
Complaint Narratives (Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter COMPLAINT ID 1682528],
https://data.consumerfinance.gov/dataset/Consumer-Complaints-with-Consumer-ComplaintNarrat/nsyy-je5y.
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posting orders varied considerably from institution to institution.68 No
two participants in the study followed the same posting order policies. 69
The data suggested that reordering transactions was a complex process
that depended on the institution’s cutoff time for processing transactions,
but the CFPB did identify the range of reordering approaches.70 If the
CFPB can identify and comprehend the reordering approaches, the
Agency can formulate a rule that is fair, transparent, and competitive, —
thereby helping consumers to understand the process and not be unaware
of overdraft charges.71
C.

Critiques of the CFPB’s Data Collection

Based on current data, the economic harm to consumers enrolled
in overdraft protection services does not stem from the banking industry,
which has begun to self-police and adhere to regulations.72 The economic
harm, rather, comes from the recidivism of a small group of consumers—
only 8.3% of bank customers incur nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees.73
CFPB analysts determined that the evidence suggested that overdraft
protection programs disproportionately impacted low-income and young
consumers.74 Both the White Paper and the 2014 Report also show a
disproportionate impact on low-income and young consumers but they
have yet to identify the causes or determine whether the causes are
material to potential regulation.75 Additionally, with only 8.3% of bank
customers incurring nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees,76 it is difficult for
the CFPB to prevent economic harm to this small group of consumers
while promoting good practices that benefit everyone.77 It would be
premature to regulate before data collection and analysis were complete.

68.
69.
70.
71.

See WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63; see generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2010) (emphasis added).
72. Andriotis & Rudegeair, supra note 11. For example, in 2014, Bank of America
Corporation launched a checking account that doesn’t allow customers to overdraw. Id.
73. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12 (finding 8.3% of bank customers incurring
nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees no matter the opt-in status).
74. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 18.
75. Id.; DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 2.
76. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12.
77. Id.
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Additionally, it is undisputed that data has shown Regulation E’s
opt-in requirement has had an impact on consumer activity, but the extent
of such impact is disagreed upon within the financial industry. 78 The
CFPB took steps to reconcile these differences by requesting information
on the impacts of Regulation E and overdraft programs on consumers.79
On one hand, a 2011 Consumer Bankers’ Association (“CBA”) survey of
eighteen large banks, representing 40% of the consumer checking
accounts at that time, found that only 16% of consumers had opted-in for
overdraft protection coverage on ATM and debit card transactions.80 In
contrast, as of March 2011, a Moebs survey (“Moebs Survey”)81 of one
million nationwide checking accounts, indicated, “75[%] of consumers
had opted in for such overdraft coverage.”82 Although the CFPB
collected the information after the comment period closed on April 30,
2012, the Agency has yet to reveal its findings on the disagreement.83
Instead, the CFPB’s research on overdraft protection services remained
on the rulemaking agenda through 2015. 84
Similarly, disagreements on how consumers view overdraft
protection services also exist between the financial industry and the
CFPB.85 The financial industry views consumers that use overdraft

78. Meredith Fuchs, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0007 at 5-6 (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/FR-Notice_Overdraft.pdf
(identifying
the
discrepancy in survey data); but see Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Overdraft Fees Remain
Flat
(Mar.
8,
2011)
[hereinafter
Overdraft
Fees
Reamin
Flat],
http://moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/199/Default.aspx
(studying the rate for overdrafts on debit cards and ATMs).
79. See Fuchs, supra note 78 at 11–12.
80. Id. at 5–6.
81. Moebs $ervices – Economic Research and Consulting, MOEBS SER.,
http://moebs.com/. Collecting “primary, empirical data about financial institutions’ services,
pricing, operating expenses, and financial condition” since 1983. Id.
82. Fuchs, supra note 78, at 6; Over Draft Fees Remain Flat, supra note 78.
83. Fuchs, supra note 78, at 6.
84. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
85. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141 (2012). Argues that “[t]he case for regulation in this area under
traditional safety and soundness is exceedingly weak, and the evidence of harm that would
justify action under a consumer protection rationale, such as evidence of a lack of consumer
understanding of the product’s terms or prices, is nearly nonexistent.” Todd J. Zywicki &
Nick Tuszynski, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 13 ENGAGE
84, 84 (2012) (“[t]he case for regulation in this area under traditional safety and soundness is
exceedingly weak, and the evidence of harm that would justify action under a consumer
protection rationale, such as evidence of a lack of consumer understanding of the product’s
terms or prices, is nearly nonexistent.”). But see Live From New York City!, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU:
BLOG,
18:40-19:10
(Feb.
22,
2012),
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services as either careless, or as non-traditional bank customers who
know when their financial circumstances warrant using the overdraft
protection program.86 In contrast, the CFPB believes overdraft users are
unaware of the costs they are incurring and, rather than considering other
options for dealing with periodic shortfalls, are too easily influenced to
opt-in to the overdraft protection program.87 The Moebs Survey pointed
out that “[t]he consumer views overdrafts as a safety net and not a penalty
anymore.”88 Conversely, a 2012 Pew Focus Group revealed the belief,
“banks depict overdraft policies as a protection when they’re actually
seen by the consumers more as a way for the bank to collect additional
fees.”89 Regulation E helped frame consumer behavior as an affirmative
choice—either the consumer opts-in or not.90 However, because some
data exists to support both opposing perspectives, conclusively
determining the motivations behind consumer behavior has been, and
remains, an extremely arduous task.91
Furthermore, flaws in the Database, the current data-driven
analysis of complaints on financial services and products, have the
potential to deal a devastating blow to the CFPB’s credibility and purpose
of identifying consumer behavior.92 Complaints to the Database come

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-new-york-city/.
86. ALEX SHESHUNOFF MANAGEMENT, OVERDRAFT PROTECTION A GUIDE FOR BANKERS
11 (2003), http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/Compliance/ABAOverdraftGuide2003.pdf
(revealing two views of bankers); see Tanaya Macheel, With CFPB Rules Forthcoming,
Banks Make Strides on Overdrafts, AM. BANKER, Jan. 5, 2016 (“[B]anks now see overdrafts
as a way to both develop future customers and serve the greater good.”).
87. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Launches Inquiry into
Overdraft Practice (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-launches-inquiry-into-overdraft-practices/
(researching
misleading information on consumers).
88. Overdraft Fees Remain Flat, supra note 78.
89. Live From New York City!, supra note 85. Susan Weinstock of Pew Charitable Trust
said this during a roundtable discussion with the CFPB director, industry representatives and
consumer advocates. Id.
90. Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b) (2010).
91. ALEX SHESHUNOFF MANAGEMENT, supra note 86. But see Live From New York City!,
supra note 85.
92. See Jason Oliva, MBA’s Stevens: Complaint Database Will Be CFPB’s ‘Undoing’,
REVERSE MORTG. DAILY (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://reversemortgagedaily.com/2015/09/29/mbas-stevens-complaint-database-will-becfpbs-undoing/ (calling for a reform of the Database); see also David H. Stevens, A Complaint
Database With Limited Credibility, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 25, 2015),
https://davidhstevensblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/25/the-cfpbs-misleading-consumerdatabase/ (failing to be transparent to consumers); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER
COMPLAINT DATABASE, supra note 65 (containing information for each complaint, including
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from consumers, financial analysts, and bank management.93 The CFPB
uses this data “to help supervise companies, enforce federal consumer
financial laws, and write rules and regulations.”94 Flaws in the database
can lead to unsupported regulations and unnecessary supervision when
the complaints incorrectly identify consumer behavior because the CFPB
does not verify the complaints.95 For instance, the OIG found several
“noticeable inaccuracies” in the Database and flagged the Database as
insufficient.96 Similarly, in 2013, critics were wary of the process for
verifying consumer complaints in the Database and pointed out the
potential for error and sampling bias.97 OIG claimed the inaccuracies
were relatively small, but several groups have called for a complete audit
of the practice because the comments are not filtered for actual regulatory
violations but allow consumer frustrations.98 Though the CFPB does not
verify the facts alleged in the complaints, it does confirm a commercial
relationship.99
Critics would argue that the Database is different from surveys
revealing the percentage of consumers who opt in to overdraft protection
programs—practically, however, the CFPB needs both types of data to

the source of the complaint, the date of submission, the company the complaint was sent to,
and the actions by the company to resolve the issue).
93. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 50, at 3.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Compare id. (using the Database to create legislation), with Oliva, supra note 92
(permitting unverified complaints can create misinformed legislation).
96. Id. at 13; see Letter from Wayne A. Abernathy, Exec. Vice Pres., Am. Bankers
Ass’n, to Mark Bialek, Inspector Gen., Off. of the Inspector Gen. (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.aba.com/Advocacy/LetterstoCongress/Documents/LTCConsCompDatabase2015Jan.pdf (arguing for an audit that examines the degree to which
complaint data that are published relate to a legal or regulatory violations rather than
consumer frustration).
97. Daniel Carpenter & Patricia A. McCoy, Keeping Tabs on Financial Innovation:
Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 195, 205
(2013) (pointing out the shortcomings of the Database, Carpenter and McCoy argue that this
data has the potential to be of error and bias in reporting without a better system of
verification).
98. See Abernathy, supra note 96 at 2; see also Stevens, supra note 92. The American
Bankers Association (“ABA”) and Mortgage Brokers Association (“MBA”) call for
government oversight of the CFPB’s Complaint Database. Id.
99. Richard Cordray, Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data 9 (Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau,
CFPB-2012-0023,
Mar.
25,
2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_Final-Policy-Statement-Disclosure-ofConsumer-Complaint-Data.pdf; see Narrative Scrubbing Standard 2-3 (Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/201503_cfpb_Narrative-ScrubbingStandard.pdf (screening and scrubbing complaints to eliminate personal information).
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accurately understand consumer behavior.100
These testimonials
highlight individuals’ actual experiences with banking services, as
opposed to just numbers.101 For such personal testimonials to provide
meaningful data for the CFPB, they need to be accurate and complete—
the OIG’s findings bring this accuracy into question.102
IV. OVERDRAFT PROTECTION PROGRAM ISSUES
The CFPB will likely tackle several issues in future rulemaking
regarding overdraft protection programs.103 Consumer groups advocate
that future rulemaking should bar banks from shuffling consumer
transactions,104 require disclosure of alternative overdraft protection,105
cap the overdraft charge,106 and limit how frequently fees can be
imposed.107 The CFPB can fulfill its statutory mandate through future
rulemaking focused primarily on barring banks from shuffling consumer
transactions and making changes to improve Regulation E through better
disclosure requirements.108
A.

Fair
For an act to be fair, the act or practice should not be deceptive

100. See Letter from Kate Larson, Regulatory Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to
Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau (Aug. 31,
2015),
http://consumerbankers.com/sites/default/files/CBA%20Normalization%20RFI%20FINAL
%208-31-15.pdf
(urging the CFPB to publish accurate and verified data by creating an appeals process,
eliminating bad faith complaints and eliminating inquiries).
101. See Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 65.
102. Id.
103. See Ferullo, supra note 43 (focusing on issues such as transaction reordering and
overdraft opt-in disclosures); see also Carter Dougherty, Banks’ Billions in Overdraft Fees
Seen Dodging Tough U.S. Rules, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 6, 2015 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-05/banks-billions-in-overdraft-fees-seendodging-tough-regulations (determining the CFPB will likely propose regulations in early
2016).
104. Bater, supra note 8; see infra, Part IV. A.1.
105. Dougherty, supra note 103.
106. See infra, Part IV. C.1.
107. See infra, Part IV. C.2.
108. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2010) (mandating fair, transparent, and competitive financial
services) (emphasis added).
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or abusive.109 Dodd-Frank specified that the CFPB can only declare acts
and practices as unfair if, “the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers; and such substantial injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”110 A practice is
abusive if the CFPB finds that the act or practice “materially interferes
with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a
consumer financial product or service or that it takes unreasonable
advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding, inability to avoid the
problem, or reasonable reliance.”111
Opponents of overdraft protection programs argue that overdraft
protection programs are unfair because they disproportionately hurt
lower income people112 and the fees are excessive when compared to the
annual interest rate of a loan.113 While these statements are true,
according to Richard Cordray, the Director of the CFPB, the question is
whether “current overdraft practices are causing the kind of consumer
harm that the federal consumer protection laws are designed to
prevent.”114 The banking shuffle is that kind of harm. Barring banks
from high to low reordering of debit card transactions will slightly change
the overdraft program but will still allow consumers access to the service.
The CFPB must weigh consumer benefits against potential abuse.115

109. See CFPB About Us, supra note 7. Under new Regulation E requirements, “[a]ny
steering activity with respect to credit products raises potential legal issues, including fair
lending, and concerns about unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAPs), among others, and
will be closely scrutinized.” GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 5.
110. Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of Consumer
Financial Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 105 (2011) (quoting Dodd-Frank Act §
1031(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)).
111. Id.; Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
112. Michael Corkery, Regulators Still Find Problems in Overdraft Fees, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2014, 3:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/regulators-still-findproblems-in-overdraft-fees/?_r=0; see also FDIC, FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT
PROGRAMS, supra note 51, at V.
113. “[I]f a consumer borrowed $24 for three days and paid the median overdraft fee of
$34, such a loan would carry a 17,000 percent annual percentage rate (APR).” CFPB Finds
Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra note 2; see also Corkery,
supra note 112 (discussing how overdraft fees can be an expensive form of debt).
114. Corkery, supra note 112.
115. See Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial
Protection Act’s “Abusive Standard”, J. OF CONSUMER & COM. L.,
http://www.jtexconsumerlaw.com/V14N3/V14N3_Dodd-Frank.pdf (“[T]he abusive standard
itself may be subject to abuse if the Bureau uses it to ban products or practices that would
have been helpful to consumers.”).
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While opponents might argue that consumers could reasonably
avoid overdraft fees by not opting-in to the overdraft protection program,
thus making the banking practice fair,116 this is not the case. Reordering
consumer transactions causes “substantial injury” because the process
manipulates the order of transactions to boost overdraft fees.117 The optin requirement only partially mitigates this unfair practice because
consumers have to show consent by opting-in.118 However, regardless of
whether the consumer intends to overdraft, harm occurs when a consumer
is surprised by extra charges on her account.119 The surprise results from
the high fees that are added to the account when the bank orders the
transactions in complex posting orders instead of simple chronological
order.120 The element of consent does not outweigh the unfairness to
consumers, who are held liable for understanding this complex posting
process when even the CFPB is just now beginning to understand the
process’s effect on consumers.121
The CFPB should find that high to low ordering is abusive; and
therefore an unfair practice under Dodd-Frank. The CFPB’s data
revealed that posting orders varied widely across the financial markets
with combinations ranging from comingled high to low,122 sub-batched
high to low,123 and chronological order.124 The process is even more
complex with posting orders categorized by debit type, transaction size,
and time stamp.125 Some consumers may understand this convoluted
posting process, but for those who do not, banks have the ability to exploit
a consumer’s lack of understanding, inability to avoid the problem, and
116. See Ferullo, supra note 43 (“They [consumers] know what they are doing and have
every right to get out the product after opting-in.”).
117. Dougherty, supra note 103.
118. Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. §
1005.17(b) (2012).
119. CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra
note 2. “Overdraft fees should not be ‘gotchas’ when people use their debit cards.” Id.
120. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 44–47.
121. Id.
122. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 45–46. Comingling high to low is the process of
combining different types of debits into one single batch and then processing them from the
highest amount to the smallest amount. Id. Types of debit include check, ACH (automated
clearinghouse), ATM and point-of-sale. Id. at 45.
123. Id. at 46. Sub-batching is the process of combining the debits together, such as
comingling, then separating the debits by type before processing them. Id. Banks can process
one sub-batch high to low and another sub-batch low to high. Id.
124. Id. at 47.
125. Id. at 46.
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reliance on the overdraft protection program to increase profitability.126
The burden should be on the banks to simplify the process so consumers
can truly understand the terms.127
For example, Wells Fargo simplified its posting order by posting
transactions in the order received, and if any transactions are received at
the same time, the bank posts from low to high.128 This change in policy
occurred shortly after the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found Wells Fargo’s high to low processing fraudulent and
ordered the bank to pay customers $203 million in restitution.129 Other
big players in the financial industry have also changed their practices in
the face of public scrutiny: Bank of America eliminated overdrafts at the
point-of-sale in 2011 and JPMorgan Chase assesses no overdraft fees for
transactions under five dollars.130 Bank of America started asking their
customers about the bank’s current overdraft practices and the study
revealed customers disliked being charged for spending money they don’t
have, thus leading to the elimination of the service at the point-of-sale.131
As for JPMorgan Chase, the bank changed its posting policy in 2009
following a lawsuit filed in the same year.132 The claim in the lawsuit
was that the high to low policy was “unfair, deceptive and
unconscionable,” but the case settled before the court made a ruling.133
Although banks have made changes, the financial industry lacks
a uniform policy and many banks still continue to employ unfair overdraft
126. Id. (finding it difficult to determine what process the bank is using).
127. See, e.g., Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1 (revealing that Wells Fargo ended its

practice of reordering).
128. Id.; see also A Guide to Your Common Checking Account Fees 2, WELLS FARGO
BANK,
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/personal/checking/fees/valueNV.pdf?https://www.wellsfargo.com/assets/pdf/personal/checking/fees/value-NV.pdf (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016) (outlining its banking fees for checking accounts).
129. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, 704 F.3d 712, 725–726 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 589 F.
App’x 824 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding restitution); see also Andrew Martin & Ron Lieber,
Wells Fargo Loses Ruling on Overdraft Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/11/business/11wells.html?_r=0 (losing case).
130. Halah Touryalai, Yes, Banks Are Reordering Your Transactions And Charging
Overdraft
Fees,
FORBES
(June
11,
2013
3:54
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/06/11/yes-banks-are-reordering-yourtransactions-and-charging-overdraft-fees/.
131. Live From New York City!, supra note 85, at 27:30–28:24.
132. David Voreacos & Laurence Viele Davidson, JPMorgan Agrees to Pay $110 Million
in
Overdraft
Fee
Case,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
6,
2012,
1:37
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-06/jpmorgan-agrees-to-pay-110-millionto-settle-overdraft-fee-gouging-case.
133. Id.
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policies.134 According to Pew research, “[o]f the 44 big banks reviewed
by researchers, 51[%] did not engage in high-to-low reordering,
compared to 46[%] in 2013.”135 Banks’ motivation to change their
overdraft policies is insufficient, and therefore further regulation is
necessary.136 Thus far, motivation to change overdraft practices has
largely been derived from “legal battles, arm-twisting by consumer
advocacy groups[,] and financial penalties from regulators.”137 Instead
of making consumers wait on long legal battles and regulatory penalties,
the CFPB should categorically prohibit the banking shuffle for the good
of the consumer and banking industry.138
The counter-argument in support of high to low ordering is that it
ensures that major bills like mortgage and credit card payments will be
paid for the benefit of the consumer.139 But this creates the problem of
holding banks responsible for understanding the motivations behind each
and every transaction made by the customer.140 The potential abuse by
banks controlling the order of transactions outweighs the consumer
benefit.141 Instead of imposing this responsibility on the bank, the
consumer should be responsible for keeping track of their spending order.
Furthermore, by paying the consumer’s highest bill first, the bank is
taking away the primary insulation that a person has to prevent them from
over drafting multiple times on smaller amounts.142

134. See Checks and Balances: 2014 Update, THE PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2014/04/09/checks-andbalances-2014-update (charting and examining the overdraft services of different banks in the
U.S.).
135. Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1.
136. See id. (revealing no uniform practice).
137. Macheel, supra note 86; see also Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1.
138. Macheel, supra note 86; see Dougherty, supra note 104 (“The unfair, deceptive and
abusive nature of bank overdrafts calls for deliberate, strong action by the CFPB.”) (internal
citation marks omitted).
139. Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1.
140. Sheshunoff, supra note 86, at 19 (stating that conclusively determining the
motivations behind consumer behavior a difficult task that still has not been determined);
supra Part III.
141. See Lee, supra note 115, at 119 (“[T]he abusive standard itself may be subject to
abuse if the Bureau uses it to ban products or practices that would have been helpful to
consumers.”).
142. Id.

270
B.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

Transparent

The opt-in requirement is too lenient on disclosing alternative
options for consumers and increasing disclosure requirements will better
serve the goal of promoting transparent practices. Transparency concerns
arise from banks not revealing alternative options to overdraft services
and from the ambiguous way banks promote the opt-in requirement.143
To resolve disclosure issues, Congress gave the CFPB the direct
authority to conduct a trial disclosure program “if limited in time and
scope, subject to specified standards and procedures, and for the purpose
of providing trial disclosures to consumers that are designed to improve
upon [forms].”144 The CFPB issued a notice for comment and request to
collect public feedback on its proposed model disclosure form associated
with overdraft protection programs.145
One recommendation to further transparency is to change the
language of Regulation E’s provision requiring the disclosure of
alternative plans for covering overdrafts from permissive to
mandatory.146 Currently, “[a]n institution may, but is not required to, list
additional alternatives for the payment of overdrafts.”147 The CFPB has
listed alternatives to the overdraft service, but the goal of promoting good
financial practices is only met halfway. 148 Other options for customers
include opting out of overdraft protection programs anytime, tracking
their balance carefully, signing up for low balance alerts, and shopping
around for a different account.149 These options are also highlighted on
the CFPB website and are fair practices that could be implemented by
banks, thereby giving consumers a choice to ensure they avoid deceptive
and abusive practices.150 The CFPB needs to ensure banks actually
inform consumers of these options to meet the agency’s goal of

143. See e.g., Regions Bank, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU No. 2015-CFPB-0009 (Apr.
28, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201504_cfpb_consent-order_regions-bank.pdf.
144. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1032(e)(1); 12 U.S.C. § 5332(e)(1) (2010).
145. Comment Request, Web-Based Quantitative Testing of Point of Sale/ATM
(POS/ATM) Overdraft Disclosure Forms, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0037 (Sept. 4, 2015).
146. Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. §
1005.17(d)(5) (2012).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Rutherford, supra note 17.
150. Id.
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promoting transparent practices.151
Additionally, the FDIC recommended enhancing periodic
statements and employing a targeted outreach approach as two ways of
demonstrating the FDIC’s guidance on follow-up action.152 The CFPB
should combine both ways to provide important information to frequent
users and to dispel the notion that they are misinformed.153 Institutions
can employ different approaches to meet this recommendation, but the
purpose is to target and monitor the recidivists154 in order to meet the
CFPB’s goal of educating consumers.155 An “enhancement” could mean
including a message on the periodic statement that describes how the
customer could contact the institution to discuss alternative options with
a knowledgeable customer service representative.156
One way to accomplish a targeted outreach approach is through
undertaking “meaningful and effective follow-up:”157
Meaningful and effective . . . means that the institution
has made reasonable efforts to provide the customer with
information on alternatives to overdraft payment
programs that may be better-suited to the individual’s
need for short-term credit, as well as a clear mechanism
for the customer to avail himself or herself of those
alternatives.158
Follow-up action includes contacting the customer personally,
informing the customer of available alternatives, and financial

151. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 30 (meeting CFPB
goals).
152. GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 1.
153. Id.
154. FAQ, supra note 52, at 3 (“The institution should be able to demonstrate that it
monitors account usage, undertakes programs designed to address excessive or chronic use,
and monitors its success in informing frequent users of overdraft payment programs of the
high cumulative costs of the program.”)
155. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 30, at 10–11.
156. FAQ, supra note 52, at 6 (“For example, the following statement could be used: ‘You
have been paying multiple overdraft fees and there may be cheaper alternative products that
may be better suited for your needs. Please call [name of employee] at xxx-xxx-xxxx to
discuss other options with a customer service representative or visit us at your local
branch.’”).
157. FAQ, supra note 52, at 5; see Guidance, supra note 52, at 3.
158. FAQ, supra note 52, at 2.
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counseling.159 The 2014 Study determined nearly one in five consumers
accessed the overdraft service more than ten times per year.160
Furthermore, 82.3% of accounts incur three or fewer overdrafts a year,
leaving a smaller targeted number of customers.161 Because of this, the
CFPB should require banks to personally contact the consumer after the
fourth overdraft fee per year. This follow-up requirement will positively
affect consumers’ choice to opt-in by ensuring consumers know and
understand the financial consequences of overdrafts while allowing them
the personal choice to overdraft as many times as they please.162
“Under this [combined] approach, it would be reasonable for an
institution to continue to send enhanced periodic statements to a customer
for as long as the customer continues chronic or excessive usage.”163 This
idea complements the recommendation of requiring banks offering
overdraft services to reveal all possible options.164 The goal is to help
consumers make informed decisions when faced with many options to
manage the need for short-term credit.165
Transparency concerns also exist about the manner in which
some institutions present the opt-in option to their existing checking
account customers.166 The Birmingham, Alabama-based Regions Bank
administrative case167 provides a perfect example of how vigilant

159. GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 4.
160. This does depend on the banks overdraft protection program charging for the number

of transactions or the number of overdraft fees incurred by the same transaction. WHITE
PAPER, supra note 49, at 44 (varying overdraft practices).
161. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12 (finding, additionally, that 8.3% of bank
customers incur nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees no matter the opt-in status).
162. FAQ, supra note 52, at 6; GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 3. For example, if a consumer
overdraws his or her account on more than six occasions where a fee is charged in a rolling
twelve-month period, the bank must undertake meaningful and effective follow-up. Id.
163. FAQ, supra note 52, at 6.
164. See Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. §
1005.17(d)(5) (2012) (recommending banks that offer overdraft services to provide
alternative options to the consumer).
165. See FAQ, supra note 52, at 4 (urging banks to inform excessive users of alternative
options other than overdraft services); GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 6 (recommending
personally contacting consumers to help inform consumers of all the options to financial
services).
166. Fuchs, supra note 78, at 5–6; CTR. FOR RESP. LENDING, BANKS COLLECT OVERDRAFT
OPT-INS
THROUGH
MISLEADING
MARKETING,
2
(Apr.
2011),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/policy-legislation/regulators/CRL-ODSurvey-Brief-final-2-4-25-11.pdf.
167. Regions Bank, supra note 143.
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oversight of Regulation E can help create more transparent markets.168
The CFPB, in its role as enforcer of Regulation E, realized that Regions
continued charging a subset of customers’ overdraft fees pursuant to
overdraft protection plans without their express consent.169 After finding
that Regions did not follow the opt-in regulation, it was fined $7.5 million
and forced to reimburse all adversely affected customers. 170 The
aforementioned recommendations will police banks in their promotion
and provide transparency to consumers.
C.

Competitive

In fulfilling its purpose, the CFPB must also ensure that markets
for consumer financial products and services are competitive.171 The test
is to weigh the substantial injury to consumers against free market access
and innovation.172 If the balance weighs in favor of competition (i.e. free
market access and innovation), the consumer financial product or service
passes the test.173
1. A Cap on the Amount Charged for Overdraft Fees
Capping fees will fail the competitive test and should not be
implemented in future regulation. The opt-in requirement mitigates the
need for a cap because not only do consumers have to show consent by
opting in, but also consumers are informed as to how much they will be
charged for each overdraft fee.174 According to Regulation E, the
institution must disclose the maximum fee that may be imposed.175
Banks must ask consumers if they wish to enroll in an overdraft
protection program and they must provide an explanation of the

168. Sullivan, supra note 32 (discussing strict enforcement of Regulation E and its effect
on banks and consumers).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
172. Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(B); §1021(a), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5511(a).
173. Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(B).
174. Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R.
§ 1005.17(d) (2012).
175. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17(d)(3).

274

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

program.176 The burden should be on the consumer to read and remember
how much the bank charges for overdrafts before opting-in. Capping fees
would hurt the free market because the different services banks provide
allow consumers to choose the best bank for their particular needs.177
Some opponents of overdraft protection programs argue for a cap
on the maximum fee charged, but others view such an approach as too
paternalistic.178 Consumers have the option to search for a bank that fits
their needs and charges a fee they are willing to pay. 179 For those enrolled
in an overdraft protection program, the median overdraft fee rose to $36
in 2015.180 However, the CFPB study determined per-item fees ranged
from a low of $10 to a high of $45. 181 Without the cap, consumers have
the option to switch to banks that have a de minimis waiver such as J.P.
Morgan, or a lower overdraft fee.182
2. Limitations on the How Frequently Fees Can Be Imposed
The CFPB will likely not include a regulation limiting how
frequently fees can be imposed.183 The CFPB study revealed a broad
range of fee frequencies.184 The lowest number of overdraft and NSF
fees that were charged in a day was two and the highest number was
twelve.185 With this in mind, consumers have the option to search around
before choosing a bank.186 Instead of limiting the frequency of fees, the
176. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17(d).
177. Richard Barrington, Protection Racket: A Wake-Up Call On Overdraft Fees, FORBES

(June 26, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2013/06/26/protectionracket-a-wake-up-call-on-overdraft-fees/#2715e4857a0b206a7b0d9581.
178. Compare Barbara S. Mishkin, Rep. Maloney Urges CFPB to Limit Overdraft Fees
and Expand Opt-in Rules, BALLARD SPAHR L. FIRM BLOG (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2014/09/11/rep-maloney-urges-cfpb-to-limit-overdraft-feesand-expand-opt-in-rules/ (urging a uniform cap on overdraft fees), with Barrington, supra
note 177 (capping overdraft fees can cost customers more money as banks raise others fees to
make up for lost revenue).
179. Rutherford, supra note 17.
180. See Dougherty, supra note 103.
181. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 52.
182. The de minimis waiver prevents overdrafts on small amounts. See WHITE PAPER,
supra note 49, at 53 (“In layman’s terms, de minimis thresholds prevent instances in which a
consumer may be charged a $35 fee overdrawing his or her account while buying a $3 cup of
coffee.”).
183. Barrington, supra note 177 (denying a form of banking service to customers).
184. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 54.
185. Id. at 53.
186. Rutherford, supra note 17.
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recommendation of contacting recidivist consumers should be adopted,
since it sufficiently addresses this problem.187 As long as the consumer
is informed, which is the goal of the CFPB, then the consumer still has
the freedom to choose to overdraft.188
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION
Tension exists regarding whether regulation is needed for
overdraft protection programs.189 One on hand, the market can police
various issues such as creating competitive fees. 190 If one bank’s fee is
too high, consumers can go to a competitor offering a lower fee.191 The
CFPB is essentially relying on the notion that if “you know better, you
do better.”192 On the other hand, the quote “when people show you who
they are, believe them”193 characterizes the “8.3[%].”194 These
consumers are informed of the consequences of their actions, but
continue making poor financial choices.195 The problem lies between
consumer choice and paternalistic regulation.
Barring the banking shuffle and implementing better disclosure
requirements will create a better overdraft protection program while
recognizing the consumer’s right to make informed decision without
government interference.196 People need access to money in case of
emergencies, which, for some, may include enjoying their morning
coffee.197 Thus, informed customers can make a rational decision about
187. GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 6.
188. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 30, at 23.
189. See David Pommerehn, Consumers Lose If CFPB Overshoots on Overdraft, AM.

BANKER (Nov. 10, 2015).
190. See Checks and Balances: 2014 Update, supra note 135 (charting and examining the
overdraft services of different banks in the U.S.).
191. Id.
192. Maya Angelou, American poet (abridging from original quote “Do the best you can
until you know better. Then when you know better, do better”).
193. Lesson 13: When People Show You Who They Are, Believe Them (OWN television
broadcast Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.oprah.com/oprahs-lifeclass/When-People-Show-YouWho-They-Are-Believe-Them-Video.
194. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12.
195. Id.; see also CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft
Charges, supra note 2.
196. Elvina Nawaguna, U.S. Republicans Oppose Proposed Overdraft Rules for Prepaid
Cards, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/us-usaregulations-banking-overdraft-idUSKBN0M008020150304#hI8QVJ2SIs5uvTBS.99.
197. See Gail Hillebrand, What’s Your Status When it Comes to Overdraft Coverage?
Consumer
Fin.
Prot.
Bureau
Blog
(Feb.
22,
2012),
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opting in to the overdraft protection program. In this context, the
Federalist Society says it best, “freedom of contract is most likely to be
more efficient than regulation when consumer preferences are
heterogeneous and knowledge of one’s needs is highly personal.”198 If
people are continuing to choose the opt-in program, the CFPB should
respect the consumer’s informed decision. For the consumer’s sake, the
banking shuffle stops here.
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http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/whats-your-status-when-it-comes-to-overdraftcoverage/.
198. Zywicki & Tuszynski, supra note 85, at 86.

